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FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(d) (1) (A)-PRIoR INCONSISTENT
STATEMENTS--SCOPE OF THE TERM "OTHER PROCEEDING"d-United
States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.' 1976).
In United States v. Castro-Ayon,1 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit enunciated a broad-sweeping interpretation of Federal Rule
of Evidence 801 (d) (1) (A) (the Rule),' which allows the use of prior
inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. It was held that the
term "other proceeding" in the Rule included statements made by a
witness in an immigration interrogation, and that these statements were
admissible as substantive evidence.3 In so holding, the court has ex-
ceeded the desired and intended scope of the Rule by giving it effect
in this type of setting.
I. INTRODUCTION
Castro-Ayon was the registered owner of a van in which co-de-
fendant Flores was stopped while transporting eleven illegal aliens into
the United States. Castro-Ayon was not present when the van was
stopped. The passengers were taken to a border patrol station in Cali-
fornia where they were advised of their Miranda rights, placed under
oath,4 and interrogated by a border patrol agent. The defendants
were charged with inducing illegal immigration, transporting illegal im-
migrants, and conspiracy.5
1. 537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1976).
2. FED. R. Evm. 801 (d) (1) (A) provides in part:
A statement is not hearsay if... [the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is .
inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of
perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition ....
3. 537 F.2d at 1057.
4. Immigration officers are authorized to place the witnesses under oath pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1357(b) (1970), which provides in part:
Any officer or employee of the Service designated by the Attorney General, whether
individually or as one of a class, shall have power and authority to administer
oaths ....
In addition, 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(c) (1976) authorizes any immigration officer to exercise
all the powers conferred by section 287 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of
1952, which is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1970). Finally, 8 C.F.R. § 287.5 (1976)
gives any immigration officer the authority to administer oaths.
5. 537 F.2d at 1056.
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Three of the illegal aliens were called by the Government as wit-
nesses at the trial but their testimony tended to exculpate Castro-Ayon.
After laying a proper foundation, the Government called an agent
who testified to the substance of statements made during the in-custody
interrogation at the border patrol station. As related by the agent, these
statements conflicted with the in-court testimony and tended to incul-
pate Castro-Ayon. 6 No additional evidence was introduced.
The jury was instructed to weigh the prior inconsistent statements
of the witnesses, not only in testing their credibility, but also in con-
sidering the defendant's guilt. The jury subsequently returned a ver-
dict of guilty on all three counts.7 On appeal, Castro-Ayon challenged
the admission of these prior inconsistent statements and the instruction
permitting the jury to use them as substantive evidence.
8
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court found: (1) that
the statement was given under oath subject to -the penalty of perjury;
and (2) that the station-house interrogation, while not qualifying as a
trial, hearing or deposition, did fit within the scope of "other pro-
ceeding."9
The court looked first to 'the Rule's legislative history to find guid-
ance for a proper interpretation of the term "other proceeding," since
an immigration interrogation could obviously not qualify under the Rule
as a "trial, hearing, . . . or in a deposition."'10 As the court admitted,
the term "other proceeding" did not, by itself, "reveal its own
dimension."" Noting that Congress consciously intended a grand jury
proceeding to be within the ambit of "other proceeding," the court then
compared a grand jury setting to the immigration interrogation and
ultimately concluded that it too was within the meaning of the Rule.12
After considering the two major views on the admissibility of prior
inconsistent statements, 13 this casenote will analyze the court's reading
of the pertinent legislative history and will evaluate the soundness of
extending the reach of the term "other proceeding" to a border interro-
gation.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1057.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1058.
13. See text accompanying notes 14-21 infra.
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I. PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AS SUBSTANTIVE
EVIDENCE-MAJORITY AND INORITY VIEWS
There are two opposing positions concerning the extent to which a
witness' prior statements may be introduced at trial without violating
hearsay rules of evidence. The orthodox view, adopted in both crimi-
nal and civil cases in the vast majority of jurisdictions, 14 is that extra-
judicial statements are hearsay and therefore inadmissible as substan-
tive evidence. The out-of-court statements are inadmissible for the
truth of the matter asserted because the fact-finder cannot adequately
test the declarant's perception, memory, narrative ability, or sincerity.' 5
Proponents of the orthodox rule assert that prior statements possess
the dangers characteristic of hearsay evidence and are therefore in-
herently unreliable: first, the out-of-court statement is usually not made
under oath; second, the trier of fact cannot observe the declarant's de-
meanor when the statement is made; and third, there is no opportunity
for cross-examination at the time the statement is made.16 Accordingly,
under this view the statement may not be offered to show its truth. It
can be introduced, however, under appropriate limiting instructions, for
the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness who offers a con-
flicting story at trial.' 7
In contrast, the minority view,18 adopted in some jurisdictions and
14. There is an extensive collection of cases representing the majority position in 3 J.
WIGMORF, EVIDBNCE § 1018 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; see, e.g.,
State v. Saporen, 285 N.W. 898 (Minn. 1939).
15. See C. McCoRMICK, LAw OF EVIDENCE § 245 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
McCoRMICK]; 39 Mo. L. REv. 472 (1974).
16. See Ruhala v. Roby, 150 N.W.2d 146 (Mich. 1967); State v. Saporen, 285 N.W.
898 (Minn. 1939). The Supreme Court of California in People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d
646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1968), concluded
that a departure from the orthodox rule violated the sixth amendment right of confronta-
tion. This conclusion was later rejected in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
17. As early as 1847, the court in Charlton v. Unis, 45 Va. 37, 4 Gratt. 58 (1847),
enunciated the rule that proof of prior inconsistent statements of a witness can be
introduced and considered only for the purpose of impeachment and not as substantive
evidence of the truth of the matter stated, and the court must instruct the jury that
they can consider the evidence for that purpose only. McCormick states that accord-
ing to the traditional definition, a prior statement of a witness is hearsay if used to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
This categorization does not, of course, preclude using the prior statement for other
purposes, e.g., to impeach the witness by showing a self-contradiction if the state-
ment is inconsistent with his testimony ....
McCoRMICK, supra note 15, at § 251; see 41 MARQ. L. REv. 317, 318 (1957-58) for
a defense of the limited use of prior inconsistent statements.
18. See United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979
(1964); Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969); Gelhaar v. State, 163
N.W.2d 609 (Wis. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970). •
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supported -by -such legal -scholars as Dean Wigmore' 9 and Professor
McCormick,2" favors admission of prior inconsistent statements not
merely for impeachment, but for use as substantive evidence. The
basis for this less restrictive position is a belief that hearsay dangers
are absent where the declarant is in court, under oath, and subject to
cross-examination as to the prior inconsistent statement.2 1
In United States v. Tavares,22 decided shortly before the effective
date of the Federal Rules of Evidence, -the Ninth Circuit aligned
itself with the majority position. The court emphasized that "the ortho-
dox rule is the law of this circuit and every circuit. ' 23 It did note that
exceptions to the orthodox rule had been carved out by the Second
Circuit, which had admitted prior inconsistent statements in the form of
sworn testimony at a former trial or before a grand jury.2 4
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF RULE 801 (d) (1) (A)
The Rule, as submitted by the Supreme Court25 and passed by the
Senate, adopted the minority position by allowing all prior inconsistent
19. For a discussion of the use of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evi-
dence, see generally WIGMORE, supra note 14, at § 1018 (Chad. rev. 1970).
20. McCorMNcK, supra note 15, at § 34.
21. According to Wigmore, the basis for the minority position is the fact that since
"the witness is present and subject to cross-examination, there is ample opportunity to
test him as to the basis for his former statement. The whole purpose of the hearsay rule
has already been satisfied." Winmoan, supra note 14, at § 1018 (Chad. rev. 1970); see
also MODEL CODE OF EvIn. Rule 503(b) (1942) and comments.
22. 512 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1975).
23. Id. at 874 & n.6; United States v. Lemon, 497 F.2d 854, 857 (10th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Lester, 491 F.2d 680, 682 (6th Cir. 1974); Subecz v. Curtis, 483 F.2d
263, 267 & n.5 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Hill, 481 F.2d 929, 932 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1115 (1973); United States v. Clardy, 472 F.2d 578 (9th Cir.
1973); United States v. Small, 443 F.2d 497, 499 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Ben-
singer, 430 F.2d 584, 595 (8th Cir. 1970); Century Indemnity Co. v. Serafine, 311
F.2d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1963).
24. 512 F.2d at 874-75 (9th Cir. 1975). In United States v. Cunningham, 446 F.2d
194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), the government sought to use prior
inconsistent statements made to an F.B.I. agent during an interrogation. Judge Friendly
held their statements inadmissible except for purposes of impeachment because the
agents' statements were not made at a former trial or before a grand jury. Id. at 197.
See also United States v. Jordano, 521 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Rivera, 513 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964).
25. In March 1965, Chief Justice Warren appointed an advisory committee to
formulate rules of evidence for the federal courts. The preliminary draft prepared by the
committee was published and circulated in March, 1969. See 46 F.R.D. 161. By order
entered on November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court prescribed Federal Rules of Evidence
to be effective July 1, 1973. See 56 F.R.D. 183. Pursuant to various enabling acts,
Chief Justice Burger transmitted the rules to Congress on February 5, 1973. Congress
then amended the rules and enacted them into law. 28 U.S.C. app. (Supp. V 1975).
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statements to be used as substantive evidence. 26 This version departed
from the position held by most of the circuits, 27 and it received a harsh
reception in the House of Representatives.
The House subcommittee which considered the Rule 28 was unwilling
to adopt the unrestricted Supreme Court version passed by the Senate.
It sought to limit the proposed rule by requiring that the original state-
ment be made under oath, subject to the penalty of perjury, and given
at a trial, hearing, deposition, or before a grand jury.29 The subcom-
mittee reasoned that only in these settings could one be certain that
the original statement was in fact made. Further, an assurance of
reliability was provided because the declarant was under oath at the
time of the original statement.30 The effect of these limitations was
to achieve a position similar to that of the Second Circuit.3 1
The House Committee on the Judiciary then added a further limi-
tation, requiring that the original statement must have been subject to
cross-examination. 2 Moreover, the reference to grand jury pro-
ceedings was deleted. 3 Thus, the House's version imposed harsh re-
strictions on the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements.
The Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence strongly ob-
jected to the changes made by the House. 4 The Committee argued
that in-court cross-examination was adequate to discern the truthfulness
of the prior statement. It reasoned that a witness, who has made an
earlier statement which is later contradicted at trial, is given the oppor-
tunity to explain the inconsistency under cross-examination and in the
presence of the court or jury. Thus, according to the Advisory Com-
mittee, any dangers that might otherwise accompany the admission of
prior statements are removed. 5
In its resolution of the House-Senate conflict, the Conference Coin-
The effective date of the rules was the 180th day after the date of enactment: July 1,
1975.
26. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. 15-16 (1974).
27. See note 23 supra.
28. House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice. See 120 CONG. Rc. H543 (daily ed.
Feb. 6, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Mann).
29. See 120 CONG. REc. H560-61 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Mayne).
30. Id.
31. See note 24 supra.
32. H.R. ReP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973).
33. Id.
34. See Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 64-66 (1974).
35. Id.
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mittee adopted the Senate version with an "amendment," which added
the requirements that the prior inconsistent statement be: (1) given un-
der oath; (2) subject to prosecution for perjury; and (3) given in a
"trial, hearing, other proceeding, or in a deposition."3 6 In fact, the
amendment was the limitation originally imposed by the House sub-
committee.37 Therefore, as finally adopted, the Rule imposed condi-
tions upon the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements. As a
result of the compromise, the House's requirement of cross-examina-
tion was not added to the amendment, but the Rule implicitly covered
statements made before a grand jury.8
From its reading of the legislative history, the court in Castro-Ayon
concluded that "Congress intended the term 'other proceeding' to in-
elude the immigration interrogation held by [the agent]." '  The
court's conclusion was based on the following reasoning. First, rather
than use the words "grand jury" to limit the Rule, the Conference Com-
mittee used the term "other proceeding," which the court felt evinced
an intention to extend the limits beyond a grand jury proceeding. 40
Rather than adopt the House version of the Rule and delete restrictions,
the Conference Committee adopted the less restrictive Senate version
and added limitations. Second, the court compared a grand jury pro-
ceeding to an immigration interrogation and found no significant differ-
ences. 41 This reasoning will be considered in the course of the follow-
ing analysis.
IV. THE MEANING OF THE TERM "OTHER PROCEEDING"
A. A Critique of the Court's Reading of the Legislative History
A proper reading of the legislative history behind the Rule reveals
that the term "other proceeding" was adopted with reference to a
grand jury proceeding.42 If the debates partially centered around the
inclusion or exclusion of this type of proceeding, then it seems clear
that extending the limits of "other proceeding" to an immigration
interrogation goes well beyond the spirit of compromise reached by
36. H.R. CoNw. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974).
37. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
38. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974).
39. 537 F.2d at 1057.
40. Id. at 1058.
41. Id.; see discussion of comparison of grand jury to immigration proceeding in text
accompanying notes 51-61 infra.
42. See text accompanying notes 29-33 supra.
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the House and Senate.43
The Senate had advocated an unqualified use of prior incon-
sistent statements.44 The House had placed strict limits on the
substantive use of prior inconsistent statements.43 The Rule at-
tempts to strike a delicate balance and must, of necessity, embrace both
positions. The compromise reached adopts the Senate version with an
amendment. It would appear that such an amendment must refer to
the limits asserted by the House, lest the meaning of the compromise
be read out of the Rule.40 Conversely, if the Conference Committee
had adopted the House version with an amendment, such amendment
would refer to the Senate position and thus delete some of the restric-
tions. The inclusion of the term "other proceeding" was the result of
the compromise. As a compromise, it was intended to inject into the
Rule the stricter limitations of the House version.
47
Any interpretation consistent with the spirit of the compromise can-
not support the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit in Castro-Ayon that
Congress meant "other proceeding" -to include immigration interroga-
tions. This interpretation would read out of the Rule the limitations
intended by the compromise draft and its arduously achieved enactment.
B. Principles of Statutory Construction
The Rule encompasses only prior inconsistent statements made under
oath "at a trial, hearing, other proceeding, or in a deposition.148  Ac-
cording to fundamental principles of statutory construction, non-judicial
proceedings were not meant to be included within the scope of the
Rule. Words and phrases used in statutes must be construed with re-
ference to the words with which they are associated and in the con-
text in which they occur.49 A catch-all provision should be read to
43. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
44. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
45. See text accompanying notes 29-33 supra.
46. A compromise requires that both conflicting positions be represented in the final
embodiment of the Rule. Therefore, if the Senate Amendment is adopted, but with a
further amendment, the latter amendment must be the guarantee that the position taken
by the House remains a part of the Rule.
47. Further, since the term "other proceeding" is not part of the Senate version of the
Rule, see notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text, but contained in the amendment to
it, the term reflects the stricter limitations intended by the House.
48. FED. R. EvD. 801(d) (1)(A).
49. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Line, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 734
(1973).
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bring into a statute only categories similar in type to those specifically
enumerated. 0 Using these principles of statutory construction, "other
proceeding" must be a proceeding no less formal than a deposition and
no more formal than a trial or hearing. The order in which the words
are arranged in the statute indicates a descending sequence from the
most formal to the least formal setting. While a trial represents the
maximum formality, a deposition sets the minimum formality accept-
able under the Rule. Therefore, an analysis must be made to
determine whether the formalities involved in an immigration interroga-
tion entitle such an interrogation to assume a position in the wording of
the Rule between "hearing" and "deposition."
1. Comparison to Grand Jury
The legislative history reveals that "[t]he rule as adopted covers
statements before a grand jury.""' Moreover, as the court in Castro-
Ayon recognized, the term "other proceeding" was not limited to
grand jury proceedings. 52  The question, however, is whether it is
meant to extend to an immigration interrogation.
In Castro-Ayon, "many similarities" were noted between a grand jury
proceeding and an immigration interrogation.53 Specifically, the court
noted that "[b]oth are investigatory, ex parte, inquisitive, sworn, basi-
cally prosecutorial, held before an officer other than the arresting
officer, recorded, and held in circumstances of some legal formality."
4
In fact, the court concluded that an immigration interrogation provides
more legal rights for the witness than a grand jury proceeding."r This
determination, combined with the court's reading of the legislative
history, enabled it to hold that the interrogation qualified as an
"other proceeding."5 6
The court, however, failed to acknowledge fundamental distinctions
between a grand jury proceeding and an immigration interrogation. In
a grand jury proceeding, the jurors serve as a disinterested trier of
50. Id.
51. H.R. CoN. RP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974).
52. 537 F.2d at 1058. If Congress intended the term "other proceeding" to include
only grand jury proceedings, the Rule would have been limited to include statements
given At a "trial, hearing, grand jury, or deposition."
53, 537 F.2d at 1058.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1057-58.
(Vol. 10
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fact27  At an immigration interrogation, a disinterested third party
does not supervise, or even observe, the border patrol agent's investi-
gatory techniques. Further, there are no procedural guidelines delin-
eating the permissible course of an interrogation.58 Questioning fre-
quently takes place behind closed doors in an inherently coercive at-
mosphere. It is difficult to see how such a "proceeding" rises to the
level of a trial, administrative or legislative hearing, or grand jury pro-
ceeding.
The fact that the witness has more constitutionally guaranteed rights
in the immigration interrogation is indeed a recognition of the inher-
ently coercive atmosphere. Yet the court seems to feel that these rights
serve as a prophylactic device which is conducive to truthfulness. In
a grand jury proceeding, although Miranda rights are not given,5 9 the
jurors are present to observe the propriety of the investigation.60 In
57. There are differences in opinion as to whether grand jurors must be impartial and
unbiased. Compare United States v. Anzelmo, 319 F. Supp. 1106, 1113-14 (E.D. La.
1970) (permitting challenges to jurors on grounds of bias) with United States v.
Knowles, 147 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D.D.C. 1957) (not allowing a bias challenge). However,
grand jurors exercise considerable independence from the prosecutor in both their in-
vestigative and screening function. For example, they may act as a buffer between the
prosecutor and the public by serving as an "independent legal body." See A.B.A.,
STANDARDS RELATING To THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION §
3.5(a) (approved draft 1971).
Most grand jurors are drawn randomly from a list of all registered voters. It is the
express policy of the United States government that "all litigants in Federal courts
entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random
from a fair cross-section of the community . . . ." Jury Selection and Service Act of
1968 § 1861, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970) (Declaration of policy).
58. Any police activity "'likely to or expected to elicit a confession constitutes 'inter-
rogation' under Miranda."' Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 285 A.2d 172, 175 (Pa.
1971), quoting Commonwealth v. Simala, 252 A.2d 575 (Pa. 1969).
An analogy may be made to the tactics and techniques for interrogation suggested by
Professor Inbau. According to Inbau:
the only approach to a possible solution of the crime is the interrogation of the
criminal suspect himself, as well as others who may possess significant informa-
tion. . . . [These interrogations, particularly of the suspect/himself, must be
conducted under conditions of privacy and for a reasonable period of time; and
they frequently require the use of psychological tactics and techniques that could
well be classified as "unethical," if we are to evaluate them in terms of ordinary,
everyday social behavior.
Inbau, Police Interrogation-A Practical Necessity, 52 1. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 16 (1961),
reprinted in POLICE PowER AND INDrIvIDuAL FREEDOM 147 (C. Sowle ed. 1962). Inbau
notes his particular approval of such techniques as trickery and deceit which, in his
words are "frequently necessary in order to secure incriminating information from the
guilty, or investigative leads from otherwise uncooperative witnesses or informants." Id.
59. See United States v. Mandujano, 96 S. Ct. 1768 (1976).
60. In In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), Justice Black in dissent wrote:
[The grand jurors] bring into the grand jury room the experience, knowledge and
viewpoint of all sections of the community. They have no axes to grind and are
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an immigration interrogation, Miranda warnings are frequently diluted
by the context in which they are given and may thus be qualitatively
less meaningful to the defendant than those safeguards provided in a
grand jury proceeding.
Since Congress meant to include grand jury proceedings within the
meaning of the -term "other proceeding," 61 unless the protections avail-
able in an immigration interrogation are qualitatively similar to those
in a grand jury proceeding, such interrogation should not be considered
an "other proceeding," and therefore should not be entitled to assume a
position in the Rule's continuum between "hearing" and "deposition."
C. Policy Considerations
The Rule represents a delicate balance between the conflicting
positions of the House and the Senate. 2 As a result, the term "other
proceeding" was left undefined except for its implicit inclusion of grand
jury proceedings. Any court interpretation of the term should there-
fore go no further than is clearly supportable by the legislative history
and principles of statutory construction.
The court has not expressed a per se rule concerning an interro-
gation setting. 3  Rather, it leaves unanswered the question of whether
the Castro-Ayon -rule is applicable to every sworn statement given dur-
ing a police-station interrogation. 4 At the same time, the court does
note the many similarities between the police-station interrogation and
the immigration interrogation. 65
The only guidance provided by the court for interpreting the term
"other proceeding" is the requirement that the setting in which the
prior inconsistent statement was made be "similar" to a grand jury pro-
ceeding, 60 and be one of "some legal formality.067  The meaning of
this latter term is unclear and therefore open for potential abuse.
not charged personally with the administration of the law. No one of them is a
prosecuting attorney or law-enforcement officer ferreting out crime. It would be
very difficult for officers of the state seriously to abuse or deceive a witness in
the presence of the grand jury. Similarly the presence of the jurors offers a sub-
stantial safeguard against the officers' misrepresentation, unintentional or other-
wise, of the witness' statements and conduct before the grand jury.
Id. at 347 (Black J., dissenting).
61. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
62. See note 36 supra.
63. 537 F.2d at 1058.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
[Vol. 10
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The primary dangers presented by any further extensions of the
court's ruling are three-fold: first, the possible abuse to the defendant,
who, because of fear and intimidation, may make unreliable statements
influenced by an atmosphere of coercion or expectations of early re-
lease; second, from a pragmatic standpoint there is little protection
from an overzealous law enforcement officer; and third, the elevated
use of the prior inconsistent statement, i.e., for substantive purposes,
makes its reliability critical.68
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the term "other proceeding" in
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (1) (A) as allowing prior inconsist-
ent statements made at an immigration interrogation to be used as sub-
stantive evidence. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation misreads legisla-
tive history, incorrectly interprets the statute, and broadens the Rule
to a point that is undesirable as a matter of policy.
Joan Lewis*
68. Since a prior inconsistent statement may be used as substantive evidence under the
court's ruling, its reliability is even more critical than if used merely to impeach the
witness. Senator Ervin, who was on both the Judiciary and Conference Committees
when the Rule was proposed, expressed the following concern as to the use of such
evidence:
I would throw this thing on the scrap heap of injustice myself. This would author-
ize a conviction of a man who has no accuser on the ground that a witness who
say [sic] the defendant is not guilty of anything has a poor memory or is a liar.
My quarrel with the Supreme Court is that they did not hold that there was a
violation of the sixth amendment, which gives the accused in all criminal cases the
right to be confronted by his accusors. He has no accusor at all under this rule.
Oh, I could go along with it if I thought that verdicts of guilty should be pre-
ferred over verdicts of "not guilty."
Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1974).
* The author expresses her appreciation to Mr. L. Kevin Mineo, Counsel for defend-
ant Castro-Ayon, for his assistance on this casenote.
